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Abstract
As the Sino-U.S. relationship goes on a downward
spiral, points of conflict have sparked at places one
might not expect: antique sovereign bonds. In recent
years, the idea of making China pay for the sovereign
bonds issued by its predecessor regimes a century ago
have received increasing attention in the U.S. This
note takes this seeming strange idea seriously and
maps out the possible legal issues surrounding a
revival of these century-old bonds. Although two
particular bonds show some potential for revival—the
Hukuang Railways 5% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds of
1911 and the Pacific Development Loan of 1937—the
private bondholders would unlikely be able to toll the
statute of limitations on the repayment claims based
on these bonds. Even in the unlikely scenario that they
succeed, the Chinese government would have an
arsenal of contract law arguments against the
enforcement of these bonds, most notably defenses
based on duress, impracticality, and public policy. By
going into the details of the legal arguments and
history behind these bonds, we seek to confirm the
obvious, that is, the idea of making China pay for these
bonds is as far-fetched as it sounds and would not be
taken seriously by courts.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Sovereigns live forever,1 but what about the money they owe?
Over the years, the question of whether the United States can seek
†

Brenda Luo and Alex Xiao both graduated from Duke University
School of Law. They are members of the Class of 2021 and 2020, respectively.
We are extremely grateful for Professor Mitu Gulati’s guidance on this project.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

473

repayment from a group of defaulted Chinese bonds issued before the
People’s Republic of China’s inception has attracted attention from
law professors,2 speculators,3 schemers,4 and potentially the Trump
White House. 5 With the growing call to punish China for the
COVID-19 pandemic rising inside the Beltway, even members of
Congress have entertained the idea of compelling China to pay for
these century-old bonds. A concurrent resolution has even been
introduced to Congress, 6 driving the issue under the spotlight yet
again.7
What exactly are these bonds?
Before the Chinese
Communist Party (the “CCP”) established the People’s Republic of
China (the “P.R.C.”), its predecessors, the Qing Empire, and the
succeeding Republic of China (the “R.O.C.”) under the Kuomintang
(the “KMT”), both issued government bonds to Western investors
from 1861 to 1949. After the P.R.C. was founded in 1949, following
the Soviet Union’s lead in repudiating the pre-communist era

We would also like to thank Kate Dai, Yanchao Di, Robertson Dorsett, Tom Yu,
Yiran Wang, and Larry Hong for their valuable comments and critiques. Our
gratitude also goes to the fantastic editors of the University of Pennsylvania Asian
Law Review. All errors are ours.
1
See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249
(1906) (“A monarchy may be transformed into a republic, or a republic into a
monarchy . . . though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and
obligations unimpaired.”).
2
Joseph Cotterill, Back to the Future with Pari Passu, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
5, 2013), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/11/05/1667042/back-to-the-future-withpari-passu/ [https://perma.cc/7ZPU-LS2C].
3
Mark Weidemaier, Pre-Revolutionary Chinese Debt: An Investment for
the Truly Stable Genius, CREDIT SLIPS (July 21, 2019),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/07/pre-revolutionary-chinese-debtan-investment-for-the-truly-stable-genius.html [https://perma.cc/9X6P-GS6F].
4
Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Prominent
Pastor, Financial Planner in Scheme to Defraud Elderly Investors (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-51 [https://perma.cc/NP4U-LEXE].
5
Tracy Alloway, Trump’s New Trade War Tool Might Just Be Antique
China Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2009),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-29/trump-s-new-trade-warweapon-might-just-be-antique-china-debt [https://perma.cc/S9DG-A9KK].
6
S. Con. Res. 43, 116th Cong. (2020).
7
Izabella Kaminska, Antique Chinese Bonds are Now in Play, FIN.
TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/7a65b99c-e419-49da-bf4733acb91ed4a3 [https://perma.cc/B3EE-22UD].
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obligations to the Western powers,8 the P.R.C. ceased all diplomatic
relations with the West 9 and refused to recognize its predecessors’
sovereign debt obligations. 10 These bonds have since gone into
default and have been left with only antique value.11
This paper is an attempt to analyze this seemingly far-fetched
idea in earnest. The authors try to explore if a U.S. court would
entertain the idea of ordering the present Chinese state to pay for its
predecessors’ obligations, which, by some estimates, have accrued to
worth just north of a trillion dollars.12 While courts have refused to
do so several times in previous decades on a variety of grounds, 13 our
8

Eric Toussaint, Russia: Origin and Consequences of the Debt
Repudiation of February 10, 1918 (Feb. 15, 2021), COMM. FOR ABOLITION
ILLEGITIMATE DEBT, http://www.cadtm.org/Russia-Origin-and-consequences-ofthe-debt-repudiation-of-February-10-1918 [https://perma.cc/3ED4-A455].
9
See Mao Zedong, Former Chairman, P.R.C., Report to the Second
Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China (Mar. 5, 1949) (transcript available at
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume4/mswv4_58.htm [https://perma.cc/4DTM-XZ4W]) (“We must . . . [r]efuse to
recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel
of the Kuomintang period. . .”).
10
Caizheng Bu, Waijiao Bu Guanyu Chuli Woguo Jiu Zhengfu Faxing de
Gongzhaiquan Wenti de Tongzhi (财政部、外交部关于处理我国旧政府发行的
公债券问题的通知) [Joint Announcement by the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Public Debts Issued by the Former Regimes]
(Jan. 8, 1982),
https://www.chinaacc.com/new/63/64/80/2006/3/ca247397581360022628-0.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZP88-EATS] [hereinafter Joint Announcement] (confirming the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China’s policy since 1953 on
repudiating payment for any public debt issued by the Republic of China and the
Qing Empire). See DAI XUEWEN (戴学文), CONG TAIWAN HAIFANG JIEKUAN
DAO AIGUO GONGZHAI, LISHU ZAOQI ZHONGGUO DUIWAI ZHAIQUAN, 1974–1949
(从台湾海防借款到爱国公债：历数早期中国对外公债, 1874–1949) [From the
Taiwan Defense Bond to the Patriotic Bond: A Collection of Foreign Debt in
China, 1874–1949] 315 (2017) (offering a full Chinese Translation of the Pacific
Development Loan). See also JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 681–82 (1974).
11
See Kaminska, supra note 7 (discussing how the value of the antique
Chinese bonds has changed over time).
12
See Alloway, supra note 5.
13
See, e.g., Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490,
1494–95, 1497–99 (11th Cir. 1986), Morris v. People’s Republic of China, 478 F.
Supp. 2d 561, 566–73 (S.D.N.Y 2007); Pons v. People’s Republic of China, 666
F. Supp. 2d 406, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (showing how courts have either punted or

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

475

goal in this paper is to examine whether they would change their
position in light of recent developments in law and, if so, what
defenses would be available.
The authors address two categories of legal issues in this
paper: Whether the P.R.C. could (1) procedurally and (2)
substantively challenge a bondholder-plaintiff’s lawsuit against it.
Procedural challenges include issues of jurisdictional reach of U.S.
courts and the statute of limitations. 14 Although there are two
particular bonds that have a higher chance of surviving the
jurisdictional challenge, they are very unlikely to survive the statute
of limitations challenge.
The substantive issues, however, are unsatisfactorily
answered by existing legal precedent. This paper does not seek to
provide any definitive answers, but only to illustrate that even in the
unlikely scenario of a plaintiff-bondholder circumventing the
procedural hurdles, she would still have to face further challenges
against her recovery on substantive grounds. Arguments against the
enforcement of these bonds are rooted in traditional contract law
arguments—duress, impracticability, and public policy.
The rest of the paper is presented in the following order:
Section II concerns the two relevant procedural issues, Section III
focuses on the substantive issues against the enforcement of these
bonds, and Section VI concludes.

II.

PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES: JURISDICTION &
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

To survive the P.R.C.’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffbondholders will have two major procedural barriers to overcome.
dismissed suits regarding debt held by the P.R.C. as the successor state to
previous regimes in China).
14
Several academic articles have addressed this topic: Mark
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Enough With the Old Chinese Debt Already, CREDIT
SLIPS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/09/enoughwith-the-old-chinese-debt-already.html [https://perma.cc/ZD2Q-MUGD]; see also
Michael Chen et al., The Emperor’s Old Bond 2–8 (Mar. 20, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544241
[https://perma.cc/RNT3-FM3V]) (examining jurisdictional challenges to the
collection of the old Chinese bonds).
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First, the bondholders must establish that U.S. courts have
jurisdiction over the P.R.C. for their bond claims. Second, they must
establish that the statute of limitations has not lapsed on these claims.
After examining all historical bonds issued by the pre-P.R.C.
governments that we could find, we identified two specific bonds—
the Hukuang Railways 5% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds issued in 1911
by multiple U.S. banks (the “Hukuang Bond”), and the Secured
Sinking Bond Fund of 1937, also known as the Pacific Development
Loan of 1937 (the “PDL”)—that have the potential to overcome the
jurisdictional barrier. Our discussion in this paper is based on the
language in the indentures of these two bonds because they provide
the strongest case for the bondholders to survive a motion to dismiss
compared to a few dozen other bonds issued in the same era. Our
discussion also assumes that the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate
successor to inherit all rights and obligations of the Qing Empire and
the R.O.C.,15 as has always been the position of both the P.R.C. and
the U.S.16 Therefore, we will not include any potential involvement
of the Taiwanese government in our discussion, a topic intricate
enough to merit its own paper.
Jurisdictional Barrier: Sovereign Immunity
The first hurdle bondholders must overcome is to establish
jurisdiction over the P.R.C. While in past cases courts had held that
a U.S. court does not have jurisdiction over foreign governments,17
the Hukuang Bond and the PDL are particularly susceptible to suit
15

U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Relations with Taiwan, Bilateral Relations Feet Sheet (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/https://www.state.gov/u-srelations-with-taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/8GQV-9VL4].
16
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 209(2) (AM. L. INST.
1987) (noting that rights and obligations of the predecessor state are transferred to
the successor state).
17
See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 147 (1812)
(holding that a French warship was immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts).
See also Richard Parker, China's Secret? It Owes Americans Nearly $1 trillion,
OREGONIAN (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/2012/05/chinas_secret_it_owes_american.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/P8X6-KVV8] (explaining that investors who tried to sue the
Chinese government in the 1980s and 1990s often failed because the law back
then provided that U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction over foreign governments).
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for repayment issues in light of the more restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity adopted by the U.S. in the 1952 Tate Letter.18
The notion of absolute sovereign immunity has gradually
declined in relevance as Western governments have turned to a more
restrictive version of sovereign immunity.19 The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (1976) (“FSIA”) has codified the U.S. version of the
restrictive theory.20 Under the FSIA, foreign sovereigns will be held
accountable for their commercial activities so long as those activities
have a connection to the U.S. The connection can be established if
the action is based upon (1) a commercial activity carried on in the
U.S. by a foreign state; (2) an act performed in the U.S. in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or (3) an
act outside the U.S. in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the U.S.21 While
Congress seems to have left defining the connectivity requirement to
courts on a case-by-case basis, a congressional committee report does
demonstrate its intent through a list of examples, showing that
indebtedness incurred by a sovereign that negotiates or executes a
loan agreement in the U.S may create the connection required under
the FSIA.22 In short, the issuance of bonds to U.S. investors is likely
to be viewed as within the range of commercial activity that
establishes the necessary connection to the U.S.
Furthermore, in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Supreme
Court reversed the old rule laid out in Jackson v. The People’s
Republic of China, 23 allowing for the FSIA to be applied
retroactively. 24 This means that a sovereign no longer enjoys
18

See Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Sec’y of State, to
Philip Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26
DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter the Tate Letter] (“The Department [of
State] has now reached the conclusion that [sovereign] immunity should no longer
be granted in certain types of cases.”).
19
Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the Sovereign Out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17
YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 490 (1992).
20
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (“[S]tates are not immune from the jurisdiction of
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned . . . .”).
21
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
22
H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 17 (1976).
23
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497–99 (11th
Cir. 1986).
24
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004).
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absolute immunity in cases brought before U.S. domestic courts,
regardless of when the underlying activity happened.25 U.S. courts
now would have subject matter jurisdiction in the event in which one
of the exceptions laid out in the FSIA is triggered.
In two early cases related to pre-P.R.C. Chinese bonds,
Morris and Pons, plaintiff-bondholders, who were U.S. citizens,
purchased the bonds on the secondary market.26 There, no U.S. bank
participated in the initial issuance of the bonds, and loan repayments
by the Chinese government were not paid to U.S. banks.27 Instead,
these bonds were only redeemable at issuing banks outside of the
U.S.28 As a result, the court held that the acts did not have substantial
contact with the U.S. sufficient to establish liability of the Chinese
government for commercial activities.29
Unlike Morris and Pons, bondholders of the Hukuang Bond
and the PDL will likely succeed in establishing substantial connection
to the U.S. under the FSIA. First, for the PDL, the underlying
commercial activity was arguably carried out in the U.S. by a foreign
state, meeting the first exception to sovereign immunity under the
FSIA. The issuing bank negotiated the terms of the bond directly
with the Chinese government in the U.S. (at a company called Pacific
Development Corp.) and the bond was listed in U.S. currency.30
Second, the PDL provides one additional fact that further
supports the finding of a connection to the U.S. The place of
performance of this bond (i.e., the recoupment of the principal) was
designated as J.P. Morgan in New York.31 This scenario is similar to
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., where, because Argentina
designated New York as the place of repayment on the bonds and
made some interest payments to New York accounts before
defaulting, the court found a connection to the U.S. for the purpose
25

Altmann, 541 U.S. at 698 (noting that many of the provisions under
FSIA unquestionably apply to cases arising out of conduct that occurred before
1976).
26
Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 564–65; Pons v. People’s Republic of
China, 666 F. Supp. 2d, at 409.
27
Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 570.
28
Id. at 564.
29
Id. at 570–71.
30
See DAI, supra note 10, at 175, 315 (stating that the bond was signed
by the Chinese ambassador to United States and showing that the bond was listed
in U.S. currency in a full Chinese translation of PDL).
31
Id. at 175.
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of applying the FSIA exception and piercing the immunity shield.32
While the American citizenship of the bondholders is not in itself
sufficient for courts to decide that the effect was “felt” in the U.S.,33
the place of signing and performance together with the identity of the
issuing bank in our case is likely sufficient to locate the effect in the
U.S.34
Third, for the Hukuang bond, even though it was negotiated
and signed in Paris,35 the direct effect test could likely be met since
the bond was issued by a bank syndicate including four American
banks, including J.P. Morgan & Co., and the principal amount was
split equally among the four participating states.36 Since U.S. banks
actively participated in the initial issuance of the bond and were the
counterparties entitled to the contractual obligations, the breach of
those obligations had a direct effect in the U.S. In sum, for both bonds,
it would be hard for the P.R.C. to claim the immunity defense under
the FSIA.
One potential counterargument available to the P.R.C. is the
one it made in Jackson. There, China argued that the U.S. cannot
abrogate the long-accepted international law principle of absolute
sovereign immunity by changing its domestic laws.37 However, this
argument suffers from several flaws. To begin with, while the
Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana that international law
is “part of our law,”38 scholars have noted that, in application, what
32

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992).
Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 569–71 (holding that plaintiff suffered no
"direct effect in the United States" sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the
commercial activity exception of the FSIA, the court noted that
“the only evidence of a nexus with the United States clearly presented to the court
is plaintiff's citizenship . . . . No issuing banks were located in the United States . .
. . The P.R.C. had no designated agent to administer the bonds in the United
States. No negotiations concerning the bond issuance or payment occurred within
the United States. The bonds were not issued or payable in U.S. currency. And,
importantly, the contractually designated locations where payments of principal
and interest were to be paid were all in cities outside the United States.”).
34
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992).
35
Id. at 112.
36
Id.
37
Jackson v. China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir.1986).
38
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is
part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice
of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination.”).
33
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this means is ambiguous due to twentieth-century developments in
the relationship between customary international law (“CIL”) and
U.S. domestic law.39 Consequently, even assuming that there is a
material difference between the FSIA and CIL, a U.S. domestic court
will likely avoid applying international law, especially when CIL is
in conflict with U.S. statutes. When there is a direct conflict between
the two, courts have concluded that the U.S. statutes prevail.40
Furthermore, CIL has also evolved to treat commercial
activity as one category of exceptions to sovereign immunity. The
U.N. General Assembly clarified this principle when it adopted the
U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property.41 The Convention, although not yet in force, recognizes a
general immunity for states with certain exceptions similar to those
stated in the FSIA.42 Thus, regardless of the applicable law, U.S.
domestic courts will likely apply a more restrictive sovereign
immunity standard and assert jurisdiction over the P.R.C.
Admittedly, there have been slight differences between the
FSIA and CIL, and the question of which law should apply to our
current case may seem to make a difference to the bondholders. It is
true that changes in the FSIA are now retroactive, whereas changes
in CIL are not and thus inapplicable to prior transactions.43 Also, if
CIL were to be applied, the P.R.C. could further argue that it is a
persistent objector to the particular CIL related to the immunity
defense and should therefore not be subject to its standards.44 The
39
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852–55 (1997) (“After Erie . . . a federal court can no
longer apply [customary international law] in the absence of some domestic
authorization to do so, as it could under the regime of general common law.”).
40
See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir.
2005) (“[C]lear congressional action trumps customary international law . . . .”).
41
G.A. Res. 59/38, annex, Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property, at 3–7 (Dec. 2, 2004).
42
Id. at 4–7.
43
See generally Antoine Buyse, A Lifeline in Time—Non-Retroactivity
and Continuing Violations under the ECHR, 75 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 63, 64–66, 70–
73 (2006) (showing that the European Court of Human Rights, in accordance with
common practice in international law, has adopted a non-retroactivity principle).
44
See Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in
International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (2005) (“The
doctrine of the persistent objector (“the doctrine”) limits the enforceability of
international laws. According to the doctrine, if a state persistently objects to the
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P.R.C.’s past insistence on invoking the odious debt doctrine, which
relieves the successor regime from inheriting its corrupt
predecessor’s debt,45 can be viewed as such evidence of it being a
persistent objector. While it has always been controversial, the
odious debt doctrine is at least recognized by the international
community.46 As noted above, however, it is well established that an
Congressional act can effectively control what role an international
doctrine or a CIL rule such as the odious debt doctrine and the
persistent objector rule plays in the U.S. legal system.47 Moreover,
U.S. courts have not recognized the odious debt doctrine.48 Since the
courts under discussion here are U.S. domestic courts which will
likely apply U.S. law, the potential difference between CIL and the
FSIA resulting from the retroactivity aspect and the ability of a nation
to withdraw from CIL becomes moot.49 In sum, on the facts of our
case, bondholders are likely able to establish jurisdiction over the
P.R.C.

development of a customary international law, it cannot be held to that law when
the custom ripens.”).
45
James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal
Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 197–98 (2007).
See also Bucheit et al, supra note 8, at 1208 (noting that the new citizens who are
going to inherit unpaid debt from previous regime are victims of the linear
progression of time).
46
Feinerman, supra note 45, at 208–218.
47
See STEPHEN P. MILLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 32528
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW (2018)
(“Congress is likely to continue to play a critical role in shaping the role of
international law in the U.S. legal system in the future.”).
48
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L.§ 209(2) (AM. L. INST.
1987) (noting that rights and obligations of the predecessor state are transferred to
the successor state).
49
See William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International
Law: Some Lessons from History, 120 YALE L. J. 169 (2010) (explaining that a
more permissible view towards withdrawal from CIL would not make a legale
difference but only gives a foreign country the right to complain diplomatically
about a retroactive change in the rules).
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Statute of Limitations: the Pari Passu déjà vu
Under the FSIA, the law of the forum state defines the length
of time of the applicable statute of limitations.50 Because there was
no choice-of-law clause in the original Chinese bonds, we must first
determine the forum state where the bondholders are likely to bring
the lawsuit against the P.R.C. New York would be the likely forum
for such a lawsuit because the case law there provides the strongest
argument for a bondholder-plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations.
A federal court sitting in New York applies New York’s
“borrowing statute” for statute of limitations issues arising from bond
indentures.51 New York law provides that the bondholder’s claim
against the P.R.C. would be time-barred six years after the bond’s
maturity.52 For the Hukuang bond and the PDL, this would be 195753
and 1960,54 respectively. Therefore, the statute of limitations would
have long passed unless the bondholders could find a way to toll the
statute of limitations.
The bondholders’ strongest argument for tolling the statute of
limitations is to argue that the P.R.C. has been continuously
breaching the pari passu clause in the bond indentures every time it
had serviced its other debt instruments. New York law provides that,
if a contract requires “continuing performance over a period of time,
each successive breach may begin the statute of limitations running
anew.”55 This means that each time the P.R.C. breaches the bond
indenture by making a payment, the statute of limitations restarts, and

50

See Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 571 (“When a claim is brought under
the FSIA, the law of the forum state determines whether plaintiff’s claim is timebarred.”).
51
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202(5) (Consol. 2021) (determining which statute of
limitations will be applied); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (Consol. 2021) (providing
that an action brought pursuant to a contractual obligation or liability must be
commenced within six years); Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 571 (“A federal court
sitting in New York will apply New York’s ‘borrowing statute,’ N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§202.”) (citation omitted).
52
Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 572.
53
See Jackson v. China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1492 (determining that the
Hukuang bonds matured in 1951).
54
See DAI, supra note 10, at 315 (documenting that the PDL matures in
1954, six years after which is 1960).
55
Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).
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the bondholders would be able to bring the otherwise time-barred
claims against the P.R.C.
Therefore, in order to toll the statute of limitations, the
bondholders must prove that the P.R.C. had breached these old bonds
at least once in the past six years. For this purpose, the Second
Circuit’s two decisions in favor of NML Capital as the holder of the
Argentine sovereign bond (the “NML cases”) would be their best
precedents.56
The NML cases are useful for the bondholders because of
their interpretation of the Equal Treatment Provision (i.e., its pari
passu clause) in the Argentine Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA”).57
The Second Circuit found that Argentina breached the Equal
Treatment Provision of its old bond in a debt restructuring effort
through debt exchange by taking three actions: “(1) defaulting on the
[old] Bonds, (2) enacting legislation [“the Lock Law”] specifically
forbidding future payment on them, and (3) continuing to pay interest
on subsequently issued debt . . . .”58
The P.R.C., however, would have a better chance of refuting
the claim than Argentina had for two reasons. First, the language in
the two Chinese bond indentures contains less restrictive covenants.
Second, the Second Circuit’s holding is very narrow. As the Second
Circuit made clear, it did not rule on whether either (i) paying one
creditor and not another or (ii) enacting a law disparately affecting a
group of creditors’ rights would alone constitute a breach of the pari

56

NML Cap. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Cap. v.
Argentina, 727 F3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).
57
The authors recognize the difference between the pari passu clause
contained in the Argentine FAA and the first priority protection found in the
Chinese bond, which may render different treatments offered by the court in its
application of the NML cases. While it is beyond this paper’s scope to discuss
the litigation strategy in this regard, it is an important point worth addressing at
the actual litigation planning stage.
For the specific language of the Equal Treatment Provision being
violated, see NML Cap. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d at 251 (“The Securities will
constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of
the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among
themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at
all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and
unsubordinated External Indebtedness.”).
58
NML Cap. v. Argentina, 727 F.3d at 237.
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passu clause. 59 It was important for the Second Circuit that the
combination and accumulation of these three actions caused a breach
of the pari passu clause.60 In fact, the Second Circuit even noted that
these three factors appearing together are so extraordinary that it
made Argentina a “uniquely recalcitrant” debtor, a scenario that the
court found as “unlikely to occur in the future”. 61 Therefore, the
P.R.C. can distinguish the language contained in its bond indentures
from the Argentine FAA’s and ask the court to adopt a narrow reading
of the NML cases and their progeny.62
The bondholders may argue that the P.R.C. has been
breaching the first priority clause found in the Hukuang Bond and the
PDL. The Hukuang Bond provides that, if the principle and the
interest are not paid in full, the bondholders will have a security
interest in the tax revenue of the provinces of Hubei and Hunan that
enjoys a priority over all future loans, and the government shall not
incur any indebtedness or guarantee any indebtedness using the same
collateral. 63 For the purpose of this article, we assume that this
provision effectively puts a security interest of first priority on the
Chinese Government’s tax revenue, because every Chinese central
government collects taxes from its provinces, including Hubei and
Hunan.64 Similar but with less restriction, the PDL provides that the
59

Id. at 247.
See id. (“[W]e have not held that a sovereign debtor breaches its pari
passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not another, or even every time it
enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor’s rights. We simply affirm the
district court’s conclusion that Argentina’s extraordinary behavior was a violation
of the particular pari passu clause found in the FAA.”) (citations omitted).
61
Id.
62
See Lee C. Buchheit, The Pari Passu Fallacy—Requiescat in Pace 3
(Jan. 24, 2018) (on file at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3108862
[https://perma.cc/NF66-XWP5]) (describing a case where the facts reflect those in
NML but, without the Lock Law, no breach of the pari passu clause was found);
see also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt after
NML v Argentina, 12 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 224, 226–27 (2017) (arguing that future
cases standing on the NML precedent may go either way depending on how
similar the fact-specific factors are between the cases).
63
See DAI, supra note 10, at 273 (discussing the Chinese translation of
the Hukuang bond, which states the priority enjoyed over future loans).
64
Other commentators have made similar observations; see Michael
Chen et al., The Emperor’s Old Bonds, at 6–7 (Mar. 20, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544241
60
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bond has a first priority lien on the salt tax revenue of the Chinese
government, and enjoys priority over all future loans collateralized
by the salt tax revenue. There is no restriction on the future
incurrence of new debt.65
The bondholders may further argue that, because the P.R.C.
refused to inherit these old bonds while paying for new sovereign
debt as recently as October 2020, the P.R.C. has effectively
subordinated these old bonds and breached the covenants that granted
them the highest priority.66 The bondholders may add that the P.R.C.
has breached an even more stringent condition than that of the Equal
Treatment Provision in Argentina’s FAA because the Equal
Treatment Provision only provides a requirement of equal treatment,
not the highest priority.67 Therefore, an argument can be made that
the P.R.C.’s violation of the first priority clause would be more
outrageous than that of the Argentine FAA and therefore render the
P.R.C. a uniquely recalcitrant debtor.68
This argument is not likely to succeed. For the PDL, the
language of the indenture suggests that as long as the Chinese
government has not been granting a first priority security interest to
other creditors in the same collateral—the salt tax revenue—there
would not be any subsequent breach for the purpose of tolling the
statute of limitations.69 Having a first priority in a collateral does not
by itself gives a loan a seniority position in terms of payment.70 For
the Hukuang bond, the language suggests that there will be a
[https://perma.cc/RNT3-FM3V]) (reasoning that the security interest in the
“Provincial Revenues” of the Hukuang Bond “could be analogized to a presentday tax on or relating to the province of Hubei.”).
65
Id. at 316.
66
See Hudson Lockett & Thomas Hale, Beijing’s First Bond Offer to US
Investors Draws Record Demand, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/c1e8897c-32a5-402d-837a-ba7df135c069
[https://perma.cc/5EDA-QXQT] (noting the P.R.C. began selling debt to US
buyers in mid-October, 2020).
67
For the language of the Equal Treatment Clause, see supra note 57.
68
See Michael et al., supra note 14, at 9–10 (noting that the P.R.C. has
engaged in preferential treatment for nearly half a century since 1949).
69
See supra note 60.
70
The “first in time first in right” rule under UCC Article 9 will only
apply to conflicting security interests in the same collateral. Between a creditor
having a first priority interest in collateral A and another creditor having a first
priority in collateral B, there is no prescribed order of payment if there is no
separate provision restricting payment on other debt. U.C.C. § 9-322(a).
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subsequent breach only if the government has been granting a first
priority interest in the same collateral or incurring any new debt.
Making selective payments to other creditors in itself does not trigger
a breach. Both bonds have less restrictive provisions than those in
the NML cases, and it will be harder for the bondholders to establish
a subsequent breach.
Admittedly, the indentures we found thus far by researching
on a secondary source might only present part of the entire
agreements. Moreover, the bondholders of the Hukuang bond may
be able to show that the Chinese government has been incurring some
new debt.71 The P.R.C., however, can take advantage of the Second
Circuit’s narrow reading of the NML cases since White Hawthorne,
LLC v. Republic of Argentina to distinguish itself from the unique
situation of Argentina.
In fact, the cases following the NML decisions took the
language on the uniqueness of Argentina seriously. The district judge
of the NML cases, Judge Griesa of the Southern District of New York,
has held in White Hawthorne that, at least absent the “Lock-Law style”
legislative action, the bare government decision to pay some creditors
but not others does not constitute a breach of the pari passu clause.72
Such reasoning has been adopted by other federal judges in New
York,73 including the Second Circuit as recently as March 2020.74
Leading experts have argued that the pari passu argument used

71

The chances for the bondholders of the two bonds to be able to show
the Chinese government has been granting first priority interests in the two kinds
of collateral is very thin and thus the authors assume away this possibility in this
paper. We, of course, welcome any historical evidence to show the opposite.
72
White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Arg., No. 16-cv-1042(TPG),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177895, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016).
73
Bugliotti v. Republic of Arg., 952 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2020); Bison
Bee LLC v. Republic of Arg., 778 F. App’x 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2019).
74
Bison Bee LLC v. Republic of Argentina , No. 18-CV-3446, 2018 WL
2018WL 8058126, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Oct 22, 2018) (stating that a breach of pari
passu clause requires Argentine to commit “extraordinary conduct”); Ajdler v
Province of Mendoza, No. 17-CV-1530, 2017 WL 36351222, at *10 (S.D.N.Y
Aug 2, 2017) (confirming that a breach of pari passu clause could not be found
unless the facts in the current case are “substantially similar” to the extraordinary
conduct in the NML cases).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020

2021]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

487

against Argentina in the NML cases has become essentially toothless
after White Hawthorne.75
Two caveats, however, remain in the Second Circuit’s later
narrow reading of the pari passu argument: (1) these appellate cases
are unreported, thus providing limited precedential value and
preserving NML as relevant case law; (2) the pari passu argument is
ultimately based on state law and the possibility remains that the
Second Circuit would be bound by state court’s view on this
argument. Therefore, the pari passu may still have a spark of life.
The P.R.C., however, can take advantage of the Second
Circuit’s narrow reading of NML since White Hawthorne. To begin
with, not all three elements present in the NML cases that make
Argentina uniquely recalcitrant exist in the case against the P.R.C.:
although the P.R.C. government defaulted on these bonds and has
been issuing and paying off new bonds, the P.R.C. legislators have
never passed formal legislation subordinating the debt it renounced.
The National People’s Congress, the P.R.C.’s legislative body, has
never passed legislation like the Lock Law enacted by the Argentine
legislature. Rather, the decision on repudiating these debts was made
by the executive branch of the government alone through a decree.76
This would help distinguish the P.R.C. from Argentina in the NML
cases in the eyes of the Second Circuit, which held that any missing
element from the original NML cases fact pattern—here, the absence
of legislation—would deny the finding of a breach of the first priority
clause.77
As a counterargument, bondholders can try to establish that
the P.R.C. in fact did enact a law like the Lock Law. They might
argue that the P.R.C. has no effectual separation of powers when it
renounced the debt in 1953, and that the decrees of the executive
branch should be viewed as de facto legislation because they are
75

See Buchheit & Cruz, supra note 62, at 3–4 (stating that without
aggravating factors, discriminatory payment alone does not constitute a breach of
a pari passu clause).
76
See Joint Announcement, supra note 10 (confirming State Council of
the People’s Republic of China’s policy since 1953 on repudiating payment for
any public debt issued by the Republic of China); see also Morris v. People's
Republic of China, 478 F.Supp.2d 561, 563 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the
commercial activity exception was inapplicable because there was no direct effect
in the United States).
77
Bugliotti, 952 F.3d at 415; Bison Bee LLC, 778 F. App’x at 73.
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“policy-laws” and have the same legal effect as any formal legislation
under Mao’s P.R.C.78 As one commentator puts it, “[u]nder Mao,
policy alone as articulated and applied by [the CCP] had directed and
guided the entire Chinese Party-state, and legislation had been used
only formalistically to declare policy.”79 An argument can be made
that the absence of Lock Law-like legislation when the P.R.C.
denounced its obligation was a mere formality, and substantively, the
P.R.C. in 1953 was just as recalcitrant as Argentina to legally
forbiding fulfilling its obligations. Making an argument through
analyzing the nature of the Chinese Constitution, though not
unprecedented, 80 would be extremely unconventional as it would
require a federal court to review the P.R.C.’s political structure and
constitution in 1953, a task that courts are reluctant to undertake.81
Other commentators have noticed that bondholders may argue
that the P.R.C. has established a much longer pattern of
uncooperative behavior than Argentina and thus could more likely be
characterized as a “uniquely recalcitrant” debtor. 82 However,
assuming that the odious debt doctrine cited by the P.R.C.,83 though
not a recognized defense, at least morally stands for justice for the
oppressed, the P.R.C. may appear to be much less outrageous or even
justified in declaring those old debts void.84
78

For more detailed discussion on the legal significance of the policylaws in China and their development from the Mao era to the 2000s, see generally
Litong Chen, Chinese Policy Laws and Separation of Powers, 1 U. PA. E. ASIA L.
REV. 49 (2005).
79
Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty
Years, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 384 (2000).
80
See Trans. Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat. Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F.
Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (analyzing independently the Chinese Constitution
and Codes in addition to affidavits from three experts).
81
Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in
U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 887, 896–9 (2012).
82
See Chen et al., supra note 14, at 8–9 (noting that the P.R.C. has
engaged in preferential treatment for nearly half a century since 1949).
83
Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11 Cir.
1986) (“PRC maintains that under
the principle of non-liability for ‘odious debts’ China bears no
responsibility for the bonds.”).
84
In the next section, this paper will offer a more detailed discussion on
the odious debt doctrine regarding whether it could potentially function as an
adequate defense in U.S. courts, see infra Section III.
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The P.R.C. also renounced the obligations of its predecessors
under very different circumstances from that of Argentina. For one,
it was impractical for the P.R.C. to pay the American bondholders
back in the early 1950s. 85 From 1945 to 1949, the Chinese
Communist Party had been fighting a civil war with the then R.O.C.
government who was receiving monetary support from the U.S. Just
a year after the war, in 1950, the newly established P.R.C. engaged
in a direct military conflict with the U.S. in Korea and the Seventh
Fleet entered the Taiwan Strait to neutralize the P.R.C.’s attempt to
attack the exiled R.O.C. forces in Taiwan.86 It was absurd for the
dirt-poor early P.R.C. to pay the Americans, who had sponsored the
regime the P.R.C. had overthrown in a brutal civil war and was now
fighting the P.R.C. themselves. In the eyes of the P.R.C., it had shed
blood to get rid of the strings from Western colonial powers, a
situation that couldn’t be more different from that of Argentina, a
willing and frequent participant of the modern global capital
market.87
Furthermore, the P.R.C. and Argentina are very different
debtors today. The debt in the NML case was issued and defaulted
by the same regime that rules Argentina, and Argentina has been
repeatedly unable to honor its obligations in the U.S. capital market.
In fact, Argentina just defaulted the ninth time early this year.88 It
makes sense for the Second Circuit to deal with one extraordinary
market participant with extraordinary solutions. The P.R.C., on the
other hand, is current on all its sovereign debt obligations to U.S.
investors and has maintained a history of doing so. The debt
defaulted on was not issued by the same regime and was from a
century ago. It would make little sense for a New York court to

85

In fact, we think the P.R.C. may cite common law impracticality as
defense against the validly of these bonds, see infra Section III.C.
86
Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, 1 PUB. PAPERS
173 (June 27, 1950).
87
See Ben Bartenstein, Sydney Makim & Marisa Gertz, One Country,
Nine Defaults: Argentina Is Caught in a Vicious Cycle, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2019-09-11/one-countryeight-defaults-the-argentine-debacles?sref=LTGwPLw9.
88
Nicole Alcoba, Argentina Defaults Again as Debt Talks Progress, AL
JAZEERA (May 22, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/argentina-defaultsdebt-talks-progress-200522212222639.html [https://perma.cc/9HTF-9634].
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enforce the law, which was specifically curated for Argentina, against
the P.R.C.
Finally, the policy rationale behind the statute of limitations
falls on the P.R.C.’s side. Allowing the NML type argument to toll
the statute of limitations against the P.R.C. would make these bonds
from a century ago never expire as long as the Chinese government
is paying for its public debt. 89 This implies that the statute of
limitations may never run depending on how the contract was
drafted,90 the exact scenario that the statute of limitations was created
to avoid in order to save public resources and ensure equitable
outcomes. 91 One could argue that the judiciary should not waste
public resources on rejuvenating stale claims.92 The antique Chinese
bonds are probably the best example of stale claims that are still
afforded attention from the public discourse. It would be a good
public policy to let these claims find their peace.
In sum, the PDL bondholders seem to be out of luck, unless
they can dig some gold out of the muddy history related to the salt tax
revenue. If the Hukuang bondholders can establish successive
breaches by the P.R.C. within the six-year timeframe leading up to
the litigation because of the issuance of new sovereign debts, they
could have a chance to establish that the P.R.C. has been continuously
breaching the restriction on incurring new debt found in the Hukuang
bond under the NML standard.93 This would theoretically allow the
statute of limitations to be renewed every time a new bond is issued,
and thus bondholders may have a chance to bring the lawsuit to court
today. However, the bondholders are not likely to succeed in light of
89

A wonderful point made by Professor Weidemaier in his podcast; see
Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Episode Two of Clauses and Controversies:
Imperial Chinese Bonds, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/08/episode-two-of-clauses-andcontroversies-imperial-chinese-bonds.html#more [https://perma.cc/5W9QD5KM].
90
Id.
91
Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 351, 360 (1828).
92
Id.
93
The P.R.C. started issuing treasury bonds in 1988. See Haizhou
Huang & Ning Zhu, The Chinese Bond Market: Historical Lessons, Present
Challenges and Future Perspectives 25 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at http://depot.som.yale.edu/icf/papers/fileuploads/2582/original/0704.pdf [https://perma.cc/65QD-HV3P]) (providing an overview of the history and
current challenges facing the Chinese bond market).
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the Second Circuit’s recent rulings on the pari passu issue, the very
different circumstances surrounding the P.R.C. and Argentina’s debts,
and the policy rationale behind having a statute of limitations in the
first place.

III.

SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES: CONTRACT LAW
DEFENSE

The authors recognize the uncertainty brought by
international law argument and the odious debt doctrine in a U.S.
court. Therefore, this section introduces defenses that are more
appealing to a federal court—New York contract law. Due to the
different circumstances surrounding the issuance of these two bonds,
we found two different lines of common law defense for potential
litigation over the two bonds, respectively.
For the Hukuang Bond, the P.R.C. could invoke duress
because of the precarious situation the Qing Empire was in during its
last decades. The PDL, however, was issued not by the Qing Empire,
but by the R.O.C.94 as part of its effort to reorganize its sovereign debt
with colonial powers, specifically, the U.S. Unlike the Qing Empire,
the R.O.C. in 1937 was not in as precarious of a situation. Although
it faced a looming military threat from Japan, which had annexed
Manchuria since 1931, the R.O.C. in 1937 was on track to becoming
a modern state with a growing economy and even paying off most of
its foreign debt. 95 The duress defense against the validity of the
contract is therefore weaker for the PDL given the time and context
it was signed. However, the P.R.C. does have alternative contract
law defenses against the enforcement of PDL, namely
impracticability and the frustration of purpose. Because contract law
defenses are based on state law, we will determine the choice of law
first and then elaborate on the defenses available to the Hukuang bond
and the PDL, respectively.

94

See DAI, supra note 10, at 315.
Of course, paying off the foreign debt became impossible after the
Japan invasion in July 1937. See SUN DI, MINGUO SHIQI JINGJI JIANSHE
GONGZHAI YANJIU (1927–1937) (民国时期经济建设公债研究 (1927–1937)) [A
STUDY ON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S PUBLIC DEBT (1927–1937))] 18 (2015)
(stating that had Japan not invaded China, China’s foreign debt could have been
paid off fully).
95
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The Choice of Law
Before diving into the specific argument of contract defenses,
we first establish why New York contract law is likely to control for
these bonds that have no choice-of-law provision. Since New York
federal courts follow New York state courts on the issue of choice of
law,96 this section looks at common law principles and New York
state court cases to address the question of governing law in our case.
Other than the fact that New York law provides a better
argument for the bondholders to toll the statute of limitations,
plaintiff-bondholders are more likely to pick New York as their goto forum because its courts have demonstrated in the past a series of
efforts to induce parties to use its laws and forum by promoting
enforceability of contract provisions through legislation and the
creation of specialized business courts. 97 There are many
developments within the New York court system, for example, efforts
to supply high-quality business courts, in order to give New York a
leading position in the market for contracts.98 In addition, New York
is very respectful of parties’ decisions, either explicit or implicit,99 to
select New York as the forum and its law as the governing law.100
In general, the choice-of-law rule in New York would lead us
to “the law of jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation”
based on the facts and contacts found in a specific case.101 More
specifically, for contracts that do not provide a specific choice-of-law
96
See Ancile Inv. Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 992 F. Supp. 2d
316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718
F.3d 138, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))
(noting that a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which the court sits to determine the rules of decision that would apply, and after
using state conflict-of-laws principles to ascertain the rules of decision that would
apply, federal courts apply those state rules of decision).
97
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New
York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in
Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1481–87 (2009)
(describing New York’s efforts to induce parties to use its laws).
98
Id. at 1485–86.
99
Compania De Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortg. Bank,
269 N.Y. 22, 26–28 (1935).
100
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for Contracts,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2087 (2009).
101
Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382
(1969).
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clause, the test based on the “center of gravity” or “grouping of
contacts” most relevant to the contract enables courts to apply this
general rule with more guidance.102 As opposed to focusing on a
“single possibly fortuitous event,” a set of factors should be
considered in this grouping analysis.103 This set includes: (1) the
place where the contract is made, including the place of negotiation,
(2) the place of performance of the obligation, (3) the location of the
subject matter of the contract, and (4) the domicile of the parties.104
It is worth noting that these factors may carry different weights in
courts’ analyses in different types of cases, but the general rule behind
always stays true—to locate the jurisdiction that parties intend to
submit to and that has the greatest interest in the litigation based on
the particular set of facts.105
The place where the contract is made is typically the place
where the last necessary act in order to form a binding agreement is
performed. 106 As has been already noted, for the PDL, since the
negotiation and signing of the agreement were in New York, it is very
likely that the contract was made in New York.107 For the Hukuang

102

In re Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81 N.Y.2d 219, 226 (1993).
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 188 (AM. L.
INST. 1995)).
104
Id. at 227 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. §118
(Am. L. Inst. 1995); see also FOWLER V. HARPER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 363 (1950) (stating different ways courts approach the conflict
of laws issues in contract law).
105
See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 5
(1957) (emphasizing the place of contracting in automobile insurance disputes);
Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 A.D. 383, 386 (1906) (holding that “[t]hese general rules
are subordinate to the primary canon of construction, which requires that where it
can be ascertained the intention of the parties shall govern. Thus, though it may
be stated generally that a contract is to be considered and determined under
the law of the State where it was made, this rule is of no force in a case where it
can be fairly said that the parties at the time of its execution manifested an
intention that it should be governed by the laws of another State.”); see also
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161 (1954) (“[T]he merit of [this] approach is that
it gives to the place ‘having the most interest in the problem’ paramount control
over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing the
forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction ‘most intimately concerned with the
outcome of [the] particular litigation.’”).
106
HARPER, supra note 1044, at 363–64.
107
DAI, supra note 10, at 175.
103
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bond, this factor alone would point us to France.108 The place of
performance is typically where the repayment is to be made.109 In the
case of the PDL, New York will be deemed the place of performance,
where the recoupment of the principal was supposed to be made. 110
While the answer to this factor is less clear for the Hukuang bond,
American banks actively participated in the initial issuance, which
may suggest that the place of performance was intended to be the
United States, at least for the portion of the principal amount assigned
to the U.S. banks.111
Perhaps what is more relevant to our case is not these specific
factors, however, but rather the policy and state interest analysis in
choosing conflicting laws, which are readily identifiable. In other
words, in contract disputes where the overarching goal is readily
identifiable without the need to resort to specific factors, courts may
feel comfortable engaging in policy discussions and relying heavily
on the determined state interests. 112 In J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v.
Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., which involves an international letter
of credit that was valid when issued and later by virtue of subsequent
governmental action became unenforceable in a foreign country, the
court held that New York law should apply in order for the state to
maintain its position as a financial capital of the world.113 The court
also noted that where there was a conflict between the state public
policy and the application of foreign law under the principle of
108

Id. at 112 (stating that the Hukuang Bond was signed in Paris,

France).

109
See Duval v. Skouras, 181 Misc. 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff’d, 267
A.D. 811 (App. Div. 1944), and aff’d, 270 A.D. 841 (App. Div. 1946) (holding
that payments are regulated by the law of the place of performance).
110
DAI, supra note 10, at 315.
111
See Id. at 112 (stating that the United States actively asked to
participate and several U.S. banks issued the bond).
112
See in re Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81 N.Y.2d 219, 226–27 (1993)
(noting that there are of course instances where the policies underlying conflicting
laws in a contract dispute are readily identifiable, and that in those cases courts
may properly consider State interests to determine whether to apply New York
law).
113
See J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37
N.Y.2d 220, 227 (noting that New York, as the financial capital of the world,
serves as an “international clearinghouse and market place for a plethora of
international transactions, such as to be so recognized by our decisional law,” and
therefore “New York has the greatest interest and is most intimately concerned
with the outcome of this litigation”).
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comity, “our own sense of justice and equity as embodied in our
public policy must prevail.”114 As previously discussed, the Hukuang
Bond was partly issued by four U.S. banks,115 and PDL was issued
by JP Morgan Chase.116 The fact that these bonds were issued by U.S.
banks and to U.S. investors, coupled with New York’s longstanding
efforts to make itself the financial center of the world, is likely to lead
courts to find a prevailing state interest in this litigation.
Similarly, the same facts suggest that the Chinese government
made a deliberate choice to structure its commercial activities with
U.S. investors.117 This may suggest the intent of the parties to submit
themselves to the U.S. jurisdiction.118 Accordingly, it is likely that
courts will read into the factual context as it demonstrates parties’
unwritten intent and honor it in court, especially when the outcome
from this line of analysis would render the same result as an analysis
of state interests.119
In sum, we expect that New York to be the most likely forum
for potential bondholder litigants. It follows that New York law
would also most likely be the governing law on the substantive issues
that we will discuss next.120

114
115

Id. at 228.
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1491 (11th

Cir. 1986).

116

DAI, supra note 10, at 315.
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011)
(noting that the issue of the case is whether the defendant's activities manifest an
intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. “In other words, the defendant
must ‘purposefully avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”) (quoting
Hanson, at 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228; Insurance Corp. at 704–705, 102 S.Ct. 2099).
118
Id.
119
See J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. 37 N.Y.2d 227 (“The parties, by listing
United States dollars as the form of payment, impliedly accepted these facts and
set up procedures to implement their trust in our policies. In order to maintain its
pre-eminent financial position, it is important that the justified expectations of the
parties to the contract be protected.”).
120
Our conflict of law analysis focuses solely on the substantive issues
and skips over procedural issues, as it is well noted that matters of procedure are
governed by the law of the forum and matters of substantive law fall within the
choice-of-law analysis. See, e.g., Matter of Frankel v. Citicorp Ins. Servs., Inc.,
80 A.D.3d 280, 285.
117
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Duress Defense: The Hukuang Bond
The P.R.C. would have a fairly strong argument against the
validity of the Hukuang bond by citing economic duress because of
the perilous position the Qing Empire was in when issuing the bonds
to the U.S. banks.
Economic duress is a common law doctrine. Shifting away
from a clear-cut common law version of duress, which was merely a
by-product of tort and criminal law, “the extension of duress into the
field of economic pressure began in the eighteenth century.” 121
Courts have been compelled to take into consideration the issue of
modern politics and the control of economic power.122 Especially
with the expansion of industrialism, inequalities of bargaining power
resulting from state-conferred monopolies were used to justify this
extension of the duress doctrine.123 The economic duress doctrine is
rooted in the theory that “agreement[s] in which one party has
unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of another and
thereby threatened to do an unlawful injury”124 are unenforceable. To
establish economic duress, the claimant must show that “the
agreement was procured by means of (1) a threat, (2) which was
unlawfully made, and (3) caused the involuntary acceptance of
contract terms, (4) because the circumstances permitted no other
alternative.”125 The party asserting economic duress has a burden of
proof to show both an unlawfully made threat and causation between
the threat and the involuntary acceptance of the contract due to lack
of choice.126 Federal courts sitting in the state of New York generally
look to New York substantive law in diversity actions and thus this
section will focus on New York’s law of economic duress.127
121

John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. REV. 253, 253–55 (1947).
122
Id.
123
See id. at 259 (noting that the economic and political power of the
railroads and many other types of utilities made them the focal point of the new
doctrine).
124
Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp. 2d 119, 127 (citing VKK
Corp. v. NFL, 244 F.3d 114).
125
Kamerman v. Steinberg, 891 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1989).
126
Davis & Assocs. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114.
127
KiSKA Constr. Corp.-USA v. G & G Steel, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9821, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2005).
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First, the P.R.C. must show the Qing was under threat. While
courts have been insistent on demanding proof of the “unlawful”128
aspect, it is at least acknowledged that a threat to do what may have
been lawful in the ordinary sense should be held unlawful if the threat
is inflicted upon the complaining party in unreasonable cases.129 For
example, in KiSKA Constr. Corporation-USA v. G & G Steel, Inc.,
the contractor was forced to enter into a subsequent settlement
agreement with additional demands 130 due to the subcontractor’s
threat to refuse to deliver bridge components and appurtenances
under the original contract until the disputes were solved. 131 The
district court found that if the subcontractor had failed to deliver, the
extra costs for the contractor to secure materials elsewhere and the
anticipated delay of the project, which may have resulted in negative
performance ratings and inconveniences to the public, were more
than the press of financial pressures coupled with inequality of
bargaining position, 132 and thus were sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss. 133 The fact that the contractor was represented by an
experienced construction attorney did not offset this deemed

128

Kamerman, 891 F.2d, at 431.
See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM L. REV. 603, 608 (1943) (“When the damaging act is done for the purpose
of bringing the other party to terms, courts which follow this doctrine will hold
the act unlawful, even though in ordinary circumstances it would not be, if they
think the terms insisted on do not justify the infliction of the damage.”).
130
But see 4218 Partners LLC v. Maguire Ft. Hamilton LLC (In re 4218
Partners LLC), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2203, at *12 (distinguishing the case at bar
from KiSKA). The court reasoned that the KiSKA court found an economic
duress claim where the plaintiff argued that it was coerced into a settlement
agreement with respect to claims that arose outside of its original contract with a
supplier that threatened to suspend delivery of parts it was obligated to deliver
under the original contract unless an “extra” term was reached. The threat to
suspend delivery was a “further demand” in relation to coercing settlement of the
supplemental claims. But in the case at bar, the court found that Defendant did
not seek additional demands but only to alter the existing agreement. Thus, the
court could not plausibly find that the circumstances warrant the “extreme and
extraordinary” relief of economic duress.
131
KiSKA Constr. Corp.-USA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9821, at *4–6.
132
Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of America, 397 F. Supp. 63,
69 (noting that “[m]ere hard bargaining positions, if lawful, and the press of
financial circumstance, not caused by the defendant, will not be deemed duress.”).
133
KiSKA Constr. Corp.-USA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9821, at *17–18.
129
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unlawful threat that caused the involuntary acceptance of settlement
terms.134
Second, what constitutes a lack of choice and free will is a
difficult question. The existence of choice cannot disprove the
existence of duress.135 For example, a person who makes a deliberate
choice to enter into an agreement when facing blackmail, while not
deprived of his free will entirely, is not offered with meaningful
options and thus under duress. On the other hand, in most situations
where the party has the ability to make a choice, courts tend to hold
that there is no coercion or duress.136
Bringing sovereign entity to the picture, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. denied the government’s
argument that certain shipbuilding contracts made during wartime
were made under duress.137 In rejecting the government’s argument,
the Court relied heavily on the notion that the word “duress” “implies
feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on the other.”138 A
government, in the Court’s view, is typically too powerful to be
subjected to duress by private individuals.139 More specifically, the
Court pointed out that the Constitution grants Congress the power “to
raise and support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” and “to
make all laws necessary and proper to carry these powers into

134

It is not clear on the present record whether G&G had a clear legal
right to require payment at the time and in the amounts so demanded. Should
G&G ultimately demonstrate that it was entitled on the facts and the law to
demand a payment of $1.5 million from KiSKA before delivering the materials
and furnishing the services necessary to complete the replacement bridge project,
then G&G's conduct was not unlawful, and KiSKA's claim
of economic duress will fail.
135
See Union P. R. Co. v. Public Service Com., 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918)
(noting that “the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not
exclude duress”).
136
See e.g., Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp. 2d, at 128
(noting that “[p]laintiff undoubtedly had options other than signing the
Agreement, such as pursuing his legal remedies”).
137
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 301 (1942)
(finding “no evidence of that state of overcome will which is the major premise of
the [government’s] argument of duress”).
138
Id. at 300.
139
See id. at 305 (“We cannot regard the Government of the United
States at war as so powerless that it must seek the organization of a private
corporation as a helpless suppliant.”).
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execution.” 140 Under this authority, Congress can “draft men for
battle service and draft business organizations to support the war.”141
In other words, because the government could have foregone all
negotiation and simply compelled Bethlehem to undertake the
contract at a price set by the President, and it had the power to
commandeer Bethlehem’s entire facilities in accordance with the
authority delegated by the President, the Court found that the
government acting through its agent was actually equipped with
“bargaining power to which no ordinary private corporation can
possibly compare”142 and was not deprived of choice.
Moreover, even if there was a “traffic of profit,”143 here, the
Court found that this was foreseeable when Congress authorized the
procurement of ships through ordinary commercial negotiations.144
In other words, the government must have known that the purchases
could not be made in a market of open competition resulting in price
and terms exactly at fair market value because existing shipbuilding
facilities would be overtaxed by the construction program.145 This
fact further supports the finding that the government entered into the
contract voluntarily.
In direct comparison to the situation of the U.S. in Bethlehem,
Ukraine v. Law Debenture shows how the court may consider a
government as a party vulnerable to duress. There, the English Court
of Appeal found that Ukraine had sufficiently alleged a duress
defense against a Russian state-controlled lender for Ukraine’s
default on a bond payment.146 Ukraine’s duress argument alleged the
following. First, Ukraine had an urgent need for a substantial amount
of capital to fund its budgetary need.147 Second, other than Russia,
140

Id.
Id.
142
Id. at 303.
143
The principle that courts of admiralty “will not tolerate the doctrine
that a salvor can take the advantage of his situation, and avail himself of the
calamities of others to drive a bargain; nor will they permit the performance of a
public duty to be turned into a traffic of profit.” Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 160.
144
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. at 304.
145
Id. (citing Department of Commerce, Government Aid to Merchant
Shipping (rev. ed. 1923) 433).
146
Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026, [181]
(Eng.).
147
Law Debenture Trust v. Ukraine [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm), [221]
(Eng.).
141
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Ukraine effectively had no access to the international capital
markets,148 nor had it been able to raise funds from the EU, the IMF,
or any other supranational institutions. 149 Third, Ukraine was not
able to raise sufficient funds in the domestic market in order to meet
its needs.150 As a result, Ukraine alleged that it had no other choice
but to issue a bond to Russia with unfavorable terms.151 Although the
substantive duress issues had not been tried by the English court,
Ukraine’s duress argument was found strong enough to go to trial.152
The Qing Empire was very similar to Ukraine vis-à-vis its
relationship to international investors and can be distinguished from
Bethlehem. The Bethlehem court’s main assumption that sovereign
power is too powerful to be put under duress by a private party is
inapplicable to the Qing Empire. Both modern scholars and Qing
statesmen have recognized that the Qing Empire had no choice but to
work with colonial powers on public finance due to the absence of a
modern banking system. 153 The need for public finance was also
largely the result of lost wars against invading colonial powers and
maintaining defense against future colonial threats. In fact, during
the period of time between the First Opium War (1840) to the Xinhai
Revolution (1911), about two-thirds of the government budget was
spent on the military and payment to colonial powers for war
reparations and other debt.154
Without an effective infrastructure to borrow domestically,
Qing had no alternative access to capital other than tax and tariffs,155
which were also largely under the control of colonial powers until the

148

Id.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See Harriet T. Zurndorfer, Imperialism, Globalization, and Public
Finance: The Case of Late Qing China, at 12 (Working Paper No. 06/04),
https://www.lse.ac.uk/EconomicHistory/Assets/Documents/Research/GEHN/GEHNWP06HZ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MGH3-AVH5] (“All three kinds of these banks loaned money
to the state which by the 1860s was in heavy debt, but which had no single
financial institution to redress this situation.”).
154
SUN, supra note 95, at 2.
155
See generally id. at 5 (noting that the Qing Empire tried three times to
issue domestic debt and failed to reach its fundraising target each time).
149
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early 1930s.156 Before the National Government of the R.O.C. was
established in 1927, the Chinese government would deposit a great
sum of revenue from salt tax and tariffs to foreign banks as collaterals,
amounting to around half of the annual government budget.157 The
Hukuang bond’s collateral covenant is a good illustration of this
history, where the collaterals to bonds were typically the salt tax
revenue of the Qing. The U.S. banks underwriting the bonds
therefore presumably knew or should have known the level of
dependency the Chinese government had on the West back then and
arguably entered the transaction to take advantage of the borrower’s
precarious financial and political position.
Besides economic pressure, just like Ukraine, which was
under military threat by Russia given Russia’s history of invading
former Soviet nations, China was invaded by the U.S. before during
the Siege of the International Legations.158 The lack of alternative
sources of funding, coupled with the constant existential threat of
military invasion, suggests that the Qing government was stripped of
bargaining power to effectively negotiate with the counterparties and
was deprived of choice. This would support an argument for
involuntary acceptance of contract terms as the circumstance
permitted no other alternative.
The Bethlehem court left it open as to whether it would find
that the contract was made out of necessity and thus the government
was under duress if the government was indeed in a helpless position
as it alleged. The answer to that is unclear from the case. The
majority of the opinion insisted that the negotiation itself did not
show that Bethlehem forced the government’s representatives to
accept the contract.159 The majority also found that in view of the
156

XU YI, CONG BAINIAN QURU DAO MINZU FUXING—NANJING
GUOMIN ZHENGFU WAIZHAI YU GUANLIAO ZIBEN (从百年屈辱到民族复兴—南
京国民政府外债与官僚资本) [From a Century of Humiliation to National
Resurgence—Foreign Debt and State Capital of the Nationalist Government of
the Republic of China] 279–80 (2004).
157
Id. at 279.
158
See R.G. Grant, Siege of the International Legations, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA (June 13, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-theInternational-Legations-1900 [https://perma.cc/NS7F-5M2D].
159
See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S., at 301 (noting that the courts
below have found that “the contracts resulted from negotiations in which both
parties were represented by intelligent, well informed and experienced officers
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rising prices and unpredictable labor supply during wartime,
Bethlehem’s demand on such terms did not seem unreasonable.160
This line of reasoning suggests that assuming the complaining party
has already been in a helpless position due to special circumstances,
the court will look at the negotiation process itself and the
reasonableness of the other party’s demand at such special time such
as wartime to determine whether a contract is so coercive that it
causes the ultimate involuntary acceptance of the contract terms and
should be void on the ground of duress. This in turn depends on how
much the demand deviates from a fair market value in a normal
market. 161 Additionally, whether the other party has intentionally
tried to take advantage of the economic necessities of another seem
to play a role in court’s consideration.162
While the Qing government was in a precarious negotiation
position for its bond issuance, it is not clear whether the negotiation
process was fair and the demand from U.S. banks was reasonable.
However, if the P.R.C. government could show the severe unequal
bargaining power between the Qing and the U.S. banks and the
unreasonableness of the banks’ demand in court, the economic duress
defense is likely to hold water.
Finally, this defense has one weak spot: it can be deemed
waived by delaying in the prompt repudiation of the agreement and
by ratifying the debt through partial interest and principal
payments, 163 even if a party has sufficiently pled a claim
of economic duress in order to void a contract under the Twombly
standard.164 U.S. investors could counter with the facts that since the
Chinese government later accepted the benefits of the contract, the
government could not then claim duress even if the claim was
whose sole object was to make the best trade possible, under conditions which
included the uncertainties of war-time contingencies”).
160
See id. at 302 (noting that representative of the government who
approved these contracts “was of the opinion that high estimated cost figures
would be advantageous to the Government because ‘care must be exercised that
they be not placed at too low a figure, for if they are, the probabilities are that the
contractor will lose interest in keeping the cost down’”).
161
See Hale, supra note 129, at 624 (discussing the definition of what
constitutes fair market value).
162
See Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp. 2d, at 127 (citing
VKK Corp. v. NFL, 244 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2001)).
163
Sosnoff v. Carter, 165 A.D.2d 486, 491–92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
164
In re Marketxt Holdings Corp., 361 B.R. 156, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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otherwise meritorious and plausible. 165 In other words, the
bondholders can counter this duress defense with further affirmative
defense of ratification, which may occur via “‘intentionally accepting
benefits under the contract,’ by ‘remaining silent or acquiescing in
the contract for a period of time after [a party] has the opportunity to
avoid it,’ or by ‘acting upon it, performing under it, or affirmatively
acknowledging it.’”166
If, however, the Chinese government could establish a case of
“continuing duress,” it need not repudiate the contract until
the duress has ceased.167 In fact, such continuous duress would even
be able to toll any period of limitations if the Chinese government
were to commence this action. 168 The Chinese government could
argue that the Qing Empire had been under financial pressure and
continuous duress by the colonial powers even after being funded by
the issuing of the Hukuang bond.169 It was impossible for the Qing
Empire to try to repudiate the contract as it continued to be a
government without adequate alternatives and a self-sustained
internal financial system. Although, by 1937, the R.O.C. government
had largely cleared up its debt obligations from its foreign creditors
and maintained a relatively healthy credit history as a new regime and
a growing economy,170 the ensuing invasion by Japan in the same
year destroyed any potential to keep growing the economy and
government revenue. 171 That said, historians have questioned the
actual economic benefits of these bonds. For example, John K.
165
See VKK Corp., 244 F.3d at 122 (discussing applicable law regarding
a judicial proceeding related to a duress claim pursuant to a contract).
166
Id. at 123 (quoting In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455
(1st Cir.1989)).
167
Sosnoff, 165 A.D.2d at 492.
168
See Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 458 (holding that when
duress is part of the cause of action alleged, the limitations period is tolled until
the termination of the duress) (citing Pacchiana v Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d
721; Kamenitsky v Corcoran, 97 Misc 384, revd on other grounds, 177 A.D. App
605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917); Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1219; Annotation, Duress or undue influence as tolling or
suspending Statute of Limitations, 121 A.L.R. 1294).
169
See SUN, supra note 95, at 18 (stating the statistics of the foreign
bond, which had been mostly cleared up, and that had there been no foreign
invasion, the bond would have been paid in full).
170
Id.
171
Id.
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Fairbank has pointed out the high interest rate and fees imbedded in
these bonds, observing that these bonds in the end might not be netpositive to the Chinese government. 172 This would imply that
R.O.C.’s continuous acceptance of the terms under these bonds was
largely due to its lack of choice other than maintaining its financial
relationship with the colonial powers, rather than gaining actual
financial benefits.
This line of argument seems to be acceptable to courts.173 In
some sense, the continuous duress argument holds water as the
Chinese government had continuously relied on a sound financial
relationship with the U.S. even after the R.O.C. government took
power. It is perhaps reasonable for the Chinese government to not
repudiate the debt back then and only now as a defense argument to
the bondholders’ action.
Compared to a typical short-term
commercial contract, our case here is a long-term relational contract
involving a government going through a complicated historical
period. Perhaps it is not proper to judge this case based on what
constitutes a delay in ordinary contract cases. Additionally, the P.R.C.
was likely not on notice of the possibility of this lawsuit and had not
realized the need to promptly repudiate the agreement by arguing for
duress—from the outset the P.R.C may have viewed the repayment
claims as unenforceable against itself.
The arguments that
bondholders relied on to overcome procedural barriers only become
available recently. Altmann, which holds that FSIA could apply
retroactively to overcome jurisdictional barriers, did not become law
until 2004. Similarly, the NML sequel, which makes tolling the
statute of limitations possible for the bondholders, only came out in
2013. The P.R.C. may very well argue that its delay in initiating this
duress shield is not unreasonable.

172

See, e.g., id. at 214 (citing Fairbank’s comments on the high
borrowing cost of bonds issued in the era).
173
See Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.S.2d 2, 28 (finding that
the delay in bringing action did not waive economic duress claim where the
complaining party feared that “another stoppage of deliveries which would again
put it in an untenable situation” and it was reasonable in waiting until after
appellee’s last delivery to sue given appellee's conduct).
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Impracticability: The Pacific Development Loan (PDL)
The PDL was issued under a different circumstance where the
issuer, the then-R.O.C. government, was in a much better shape than
the Qing. However, a different piece of history would afford today’s
P.R.C. government impracticability defense to challenge the
enforceability of the PDL in court. This key historic episode is that
the R.O.C. was a government friendly to and supported by the United
States around the time when the PDL was issued, while the P.R.C.
was a hostile regime to the U.S. from the beginning and fought a
bloody war with the U.S. right after its establishment.
Under New York Law, the defense of impracticability
requires that (1) an unforeseeable contingency occurs, rendering the
performance impracticable, (2) the nonperforming party must not
have caused the contingency, and (3) the nonoccurrence of the
contingency was a basic assumption of the contract when it was
made.174 Given the uniqueness of the situation, we could not find
case law analogous to our discussion, but the P.R.C. could at least
assert a reasonable defense of impracticability given the general
principle of the doctrine.
A Series of Contingencies Did Happen to Make the Performance
Impracticable.
From 1937, when the PDL was issued by the R.O.C.
government to 1953, when the P.R.C. Government refused to inherit
this bond, a series of historical events had happened that transformed
China from a country friendly to the U.S. to a hostile one. The P.R.C.
was dragged into a direct military conflict with the U.S. in Korea
Peninsula and China’s economic, financial, and trade system had also
shifted towards the communist system. Under this regime, the P.R.C.
had taken a radically different approach when dealing with foreign
affairs from the global capitalism order of which the R.O.C. was a
part when it issued the PDL in 1937. Such a radical change, although
initiated by the leaders of the Communist Party, was also necessarily
a product of the international environment of the time. At the dawn
of the Cold War, the Chinese leadership found itself had no choice
174

4C N.Y. PRAC., Commercial Litigation in New York State Courts §
89:33 (database updated Oct. 2020).
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but to fully commit to the alliance with the Soviet Union.175 These
historic realities rendered a payment to U.S. bondholders by the
P.R.C. impracticable in 1953.
These contingencies were also in no way foreseeable. At last,
even to President Franklin Roosevelt, it was inconceivable in 1945
that the Communist Party would have taken over China and built a
Communist regime that committed to an entirely different set of rules
in international finance.176
The P.R.C. Did Not Cause the Contingencies (Alone).
This part seems to be the weak link of the impracticability
argument. Although the P.R.C. government led by the CCP did
commit the last few actions triggering the situation that rendered its
performance impracticable, there were so many other factors leading
up to this specific historical event. For example, the U.S. could have
maintained a much more friendly relationship with the CCP, but
chose not to, after the Chinese Civil War.177
175
See MAO ZEDONG, Farewell, Leighton Stuart, MARXISTS.ORG (Aug.
18, 1949), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selectedworks/volume-4/mswv4_67.htm [https://perma.cc/L8NV-XUJW] (discussing the
failure of American imperialism as represented by the departure of a United
States ambassador who was supportive of cultural aggression in China); MAO
ZEDONG, On People’s Democratic Dictatorship (June 30, 1949),
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume4/mswv4_65.htm (“Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist
front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine
and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.”).
176
See Arthur Waldron, How China Was ‘Lost’, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan.
28, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weeklystandard/how-china-was-lost (“Davies’s China reporting had certainly been
pessimistic about Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government—which
Franklin Roosevelt was determined should take its place as one of the “Big Four”
after World War II—while consistently upbeat about the Communists, to whom,
he forecast, ‘China’s destiny’ belonged.”).
177
President Henry Truman attempted to negotiate peace between the
CCP and the KMT before the Chinese Civil War and had given up on protecting
Taiwan against the CCP attack after the war. Truman only changed this policy
and re-committed to protect the remaining KMT forces in Taiwan six months
later when the Korean War began. See Chen Yi-shen, The Korean War and the
Fate of Taiwan, TAIPEI TIMES (June 10, 2010),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/06/30/2003476734
[https://perma.cc/S4PX-QM4V] (“[O]n Jan. 5, Truman had announced that . . .
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The Basic Assumption of the Contract Was Destroyed.
The historical contingencies must also destroy the “basic
assumption” on which both parties made the contract.178 Generally,
the death of a person or destruction of a specific thing necessary for
performance would excuse such performance for impracticality.179
Here, of course, we have to stretch the common law to apply to the
Chinese bonds in question because a party is a sovereign entity, and
the relevant facts stretch across a century.
The contingent historical events followed leading to 1950 had
altered the basic assumption of the contract: the PDL would help
maintain a good relationship between China and the colonial Western
powers, especially the U.S.,180 and such relationship was necessary
for the issuance of PDL. Such an assumption was essential to the
contract and was shared by both parties when the bond was issued:
no U.S. investors would invest in China if the Chinese government
was in a war with the U.S. and did not recognize the rules of
international finance of the capitalist bloc, and the R.O.C. would not
take on such debts but for this purpose.

the US would not provide any form of military support or consultation to his
forces stationed in Taiwan. Truman changed his policy less than six months later
when he ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait.”).
178
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: IMPRACTICABILITY OF
PERFORMANCE AND FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.”).
179
See id. (“The continued existence of the person or thing (the nonoccurrence of the death of destruction) is ordinarily a basic assumption on which
the contract was made, so that death or destruction effects a discharge.”).
180
Our argument here is inspired by Prof. Mark Weidemaier’s discussion
on whether Ukraine could use the doctrine of impracticality under English law to
excuse its bond payment to Russian state enterprise when the bond indenture was
signed by a former pro-Russia government. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
Contract Law and Ukraine’s $3 Billion Debt to Russia, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 244,
248 (Jan. 2016) (“In some cases, a party whose performance has been rendered
impracticable is permanently excused from the obligation to perform. In others,
the party is excused only temporarily. Either outcome should prove acceptable to
Ukraine; delay effectively amounts to a re-profiling of the debt.”).
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As mentioned earlier, the PDL was part of the R.O.C.’s efforts
to reorganize its debt with the colonial powers.181 It was the new
bond issued to exchange for the old 1919 Gold Bond.182 Historians
of Chinese public debt have long observed that the R.O.C.’s effort to
reorganize debt purported to build the R.O.C.’s national credit to the
colonial Western powers, as evidenced by countless statements made
by the R.O.C. statesmen and commentators.183 In mid-1928, almost
all of R.O.C.’s foreign debt was in default, and only through massive
debt reorganization to restore confidence in the regime could R.O.C.
regain access to the international capital market again.184 And by
1937, when PDL was signed, R.O.C. was on track to paying off all of
its foreign debt and its credibility in the international finance market
had been well restored.185 The R.O.C. was successfully incorporated
into the international capital market as of 1937 due to the successful
debt reorganization by the KMT government.
However, when the CCP defeated the KMT in the Chinese
Civil War to establish the P.R.C. in 1949, the circumstances in China
had changed dramatically. The newly established P.R.C. did not need
to go back to the international capital market which the R.O.C. was
part of in the 1930s. Mao and his government decided to ally with
the newly emerged Communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union
largely due to the hostility from the West.186 In fact, recalling the
“who lost China” discussion in the U.S. after 1949, the KMT was
financially and militarily supported by the U.S. during the Civil War

181

See SUN, supra note 95, at 40–42.
See DAI, supra note 10, at 314 (recording that the company that
issued the 1919 bond went bankrupt and the 1919 bond was paid by the R.O.C.
with a haircut in 1937 through an agreement between the then-Chinese Treasury
Secretary Dr. H. H. Kung and the U.S. banks that issued the 1919 bond).
183
See XU, supra note 156, at 120–40 (detailing the thinking behind the
R.O.C.’s efforts to restructure its foreign debt by citing Chinese and Western
commentators and statesmen’s statements at the time). See also ARTHUR N.
YOUNG, CHINA’S NATION-BUILDING EFFORT, 1927–1937: FIN. & ECON. REC. 23–
25 (1971) (summarizing the inception of the R.O.C.’s effort to restore credit).
184
YOUNG, at 23–25.
185
See XU, supra note 156, at 139 (illustrating that the Chinese
sovereign bond prices in the Western capital market have gone up since 1930 and
reached their peak in 1936).
186
See MAO, supra note 175 (describing American foreign policy
regarding China and the resulting need for alliance with the Soviet Union).
182
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and the U.S. even started to engage in a direct military conflict with
China in Korea in 1950.
Unlike the R.O.C. in the 1930s, the P.R.C. was not a regime
in need of maintaining a good relationship with the colonial Western
powers and their private banks, nor would the U.S. banks lend the
money to a Communist government in China that was at war with the
United States. The basic assumption of the bond issuance was
therefore no longer in effect.
In sum, the circumstances in early 1953 have deprived all
practical means and reasons for the P.R.C. to pay its creditors in the
U.S. It would be nonsensical to imagine P.R.C. paying the investors
of the U.S., with which it had a history of direct military conflict, and
held different ideology and the accompanying economic, trade, and
financial systems.
The impracticality argument is not bulletproof, and a contract
law argument built on so many dramatic historic events in the last
century is more than unconventional. However, the general
principals of impracticality may just be enough for the P.R.C. to make
its case against the validity of the PDL and add more roadblocks on
the path of recovery to a plaintiff-bondholder.
Public Policy against Enforcement
The P.R.C. may also argue that the court should not enforce
these bond contracts for public policy reasons. New York courts
typically will not enforce a contract, if its enforcement is contrary to
the policy of the forum.187 Although it is not clear what policy courts
would look at when making a particular decision, certain norms and
principles upheld by the international community can be argued to
have an impact on decisions by New York courts.188
The conditions of valid treaties set up under the Vienna
Convention provide that if the expression of a State’s consent to be
187
See e.g., F.A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 254 N.Y. 407
(1930) (“[T]o allow public service corporations by contract to absolutely exempt
themselves from liability for negligence is opposed to the best interest of the
citizens of the State.”).
188
See, e.g., Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12
N.Y.2d 371, 378 (1963) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting) (noting that it is the national
policy to co-operate with other Bretton Woods signatories to further promotion of
international economic relations).
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bound by a treaty has been procured through the corruption of its
representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the
State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be
bound by the treaty.189 Even though the Vienna Convention does not
apply to our case as we do not have a treaty between States, this can
be viewed as the international community’s acknowledgment that no
sound relationship can start with and be based upon bad faith
negotiations such as the induction of a State’s consent.
Moreover, it is also worth noting that our case rests against
the historical backdrop of developments in international law as the
international community started to recognize the unequal bargaining
powers among states due to the economic and political reality and its
impact on legal relations. The International Law Commission began
to work upon the law of treaties in 1949 and during this period,
developing countries had held a number of meetings to express their
concern at economic pressure and their economic situation.190 The
final Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, together with a
Resolution requesting member states to give the Declaration the
“widest possible publicity and dissemination,” suggests that the issue
regarding economic duress and unequal bargaining power has been
widely noticed at the international level.191
While a Declaration has limited legal force, it can constitute
an international obligation if it has become an integral part of future
international law.192 Leaving legal force aside, a Declaration like this
does influence international and domestic policy, as it demonstrates
the value upheld by the international community. While the debt in
our case was incurred between a State and private parties, the state
power behind those U.S. individual investors at the negotiation table
189

In order to be a ground for invalidating the treaty, the corrupt acts
must be shown to be either directly or indirectly imputable to the other
negotiating State. Christos L. Rozakis, The Conditions of Validity of
International Agreements, 26 RHDI 221, 241 (1973).
190
Cornelius Murphy, Economic Duress and Unequal Treaties, 11 VA. J.
INT’L L. 51, 54–57 (1970).
191
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Final Act of the United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/26, annex
(May 22, 1969).
192
See Murphy, supra note 190, at 61 (“The degree to which the Vienna
Declaration will become an integral part of future international law depends upon
the extent to which it is met with genuine acceptance.”).
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cannot be ignored. To hold the contract valid and free from duress
challenge, the court might run against the public policy upheld at the
international level that economic pressure can be an unethical form
of conduct in this circumstance.
All we seek to argue in this section is that there are plausible
contract law defenses available to the P.R.C. It would be very hard
to predict how would these arguments fly in a federal court due to the
uniqueness of the facts related to the litigation, but if the P.R.C. has
the will to fight, it may have these arguments we have listed at its
disposal.

IV.

CONCLUSION: TIME TO DIE

To reiterate, this paper is an attempt to take a seemingly farstretched idea seriously. Despite the immense intellectual joy that we
enjoyed while writing this paper, we wanted to show why any legal
effort to revive these bonds would be nonsensical.
Even holding the two most promising antique Chinese bonds,
the Hukuang Bond and the PDL, a plaintiff-bondholder would have
an extremely hard time just surviving a motion to dismiss by citing
the NML approach to toll the statute of limitations. Even if in the
unlikely case where a judge does toll the statute of limitations, the
P.R.C. can still rely on contract law arguments to challenge the
enforcement of these bonds. How the court would treat these
arguments is unclear. What is clear is that any serious adjudication
on these arguments would require courts to step into uncomfortable
territories such as ruling on the political history of a foreign nation
spanning a hundred years. Given how unlikely a plaintiff would
succeed in winning her day in court, devoting the limited resources
of public discourse into these bonds seem to be unworthy, 193

193
Commentators have expressed similar sentiment. See Mark
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Enough with the Old Chinese Debt Already, CREDIT
SLIPS (Sept. 10, 2019, 8:31 PM),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/09/enough-with-the-old-chinesedebt-already.html [https://perma.cc/XX97-GWX3] (“Still, the idea is crazy. Even
if claims under these old bonds would suddenly be timely if assigned to the U.S.,
there is no practical way to use them to reduce the U.S. government’s payments
on debt held by the P.R.C. And the attempt to do so would likely violate
regulations governing the Treasury’s issuance and payment of bonds.”).
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especially at a time where much noise surrounds a deteriorating SinoU.S. relationship.
As to the moral aspect of this issue where the bondholders
claim that a sovereign debtor like the P.R.C. has the moral
responsibility of repaying its debt, 194 we can only stress that the
history of sovereign debt is never one of moral clarity. The U.S. also
has a history of “dishonoring” its own obligations under unique
situations. It has repudiated its debt during the Great Depression by
abrogating the gold clauses, 195 and refused to inherit Cuba’s debt
after annexing Cuba through the Spanish-American War.196 Granted,
the factual situations of these two occasions are also complicated and
the argument on whether the U.S. “dishonored” its obligations in bad
faith is also muddy. But this is exactly the point. When major
historical events intervene in how a sovereign has been conducting
its affairs, the discussion on successor liability becomes so much
more complicated than the simple moral lesson that one should
always pay for its debt.
This paper attempts to unfold those unique history episodes
that we found highly relevant to the case and should be taken into
consideration when applying legal arguments and sovereign debt
doctrines. Given the unique historical background and the delicate
194

See Jonathan Garber, $1.6T in Century-Old Chinese Bonds Offer
Trump Unique Leverage against Beijing, FOX BUS. (May 14, 2020),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/historic-chinese-bonds-trump-leveragebeijing [https://perma.cc/63PG-7PD9] (reporting that American Bondholder
Foundation President Jonna Bianco says, “the U.S. would have the weight of
common law and moral responsibility on its side [against China].”).
195
See generally Sebastian Edwards, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF FDR, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD (2018)
(detailing the history of American abrogation of various gold clauses). See also,
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935) (“The Constitution gives to the
Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, an
unqualified power, a power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity
its very life may depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States
is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged. Having this power to authorize
the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress
has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obligation.”).
196
See Lee C. Buchheit, supra note 62, at 32–34 (“A particular point of
controversy centered on certain loans that the Crown of Spain had incurred in its
own name but for which it had pledged Cuban revenue streams. Spain wanted the
United States to assume responsibility for these debts in its capacity as the new
sovereign power in Cuba; the United States was disinclined to do so.”).
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Sino-U.S. relationship, the authors urge readers to seriously consider
the effect of opening this Pandora’s box. Drawn from examining both
the history and legal arguments, the unavoidable conclusion is that it
is the time to put this topic to rest and to let people simply appreciate
the antique value of those bonds.
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